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Family Law in the Age of Distrust 
CARL E. SCHNEIDER* 
I. Introduction 
I have been invited to examine the relationship between American 
culture and American family law at the end of the century. No doubt I 
was foolish to accept the invitation, since the topic can hardly be 
sketched, much less discussed, within the compass of even a lengthy 
article. On the other hand, that happy fault forces me to accept the 
luxury of writing a speculative essay and of eschewing the footnotes 
that are the misery (and majesty) of the academic lawyer. 1 
But even thus set free I am still enchained. Family law is shaped by 
more cultural forces than I am allowed pages. I might consider, for 
example, how the triumph of American individualism continues to 
mold family law. I might try to remedy the unaccountable failure to 
analyze the way feminism has transformed family law. I might re-
examine the argument I made elsewhere that family law has decreas-
ingly deployed overtly moral language in its work. 
I have, however, chosen a road less traveled. I propose a hypothesis: 
We live in an age of distrust, an age in which we feel less able than 
before to anticipate how people will behave and to be confident they 
will not injure us. We trust social institutions, and particularly govern-
ment, less than we ever have. We seem less certain that we can count 
*Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor of Internal Medicine, Univer-
sity of Michigan. For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 
53 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1343 (1986), I follow the University of Chicago Manual of 
Legal Citation (Lawyers Co-operative, 1989). I am enthusiastically grateful to the Fam-
ily Law Quarterly for its indulgence for and help in my campaign to free us all from 
the petty tyrannies and burdensome impositions of the Bluebook. In addition I thank 
Carol Weisbrod for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. 
I. Perhaps I should assure the distrustful that I plan to publish a more detailed and 
fully annotated version of this article as part of a book on family law and moral dis-
course. 
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on our neighbors, friends, and families. This distrust is less pervasive 
and less intense than in many other countries. And distrust is hardly 
the only factor shaping fin de siecle family law, nor even the most 
powerful. Nevertheless, it is potent enough that numerous changes in 
family law over the last few decades can be understood as accommo-
dating it. 
II. The Evidence of Distrust 
It is now well known that trust in social institutions of many kinds 
has declined during the last few decades. In particular, trust in govern-
ment has plummeted. For example, since 1966, the proportion of the 
population with "a great deal of confidence" in the presidency has 
declined from 41 percent to 13 percent. The parallel figures for Con-
gress are 42 percent and 5 percent. 
In family life trust has always been a commodity too incommodi-
ously supplied. But I hypothesize that, while family life may always 
have created occasions for distrust, those occasions occur today with 
mounting frequency. To explain this hypothesis, I must define "trust." 
I take my definition from Fukuyama: "Trust is the expectation that 
arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, 
based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that 
community. " 2 Distrust arises, then, when you cannot rely on the be-
havior of other people. Behavior may be unreliable for two reasons. 
First, you may not be able to predict what other people are going to 
do. Second, you may not be able to trust them to act in your interests. 
In other words, I define "distrust" broadly to include apprehension 
about both unpredictable behavior and malign behavior. 
I hypothesize that contemporary Americans tend to find people too 
little reliable in both ways. More precisely, I hypothesize: first, that 
behavior in family life is less predictable and thus less reliable than 
before because the rules and roles that structure family life have eroded; 
second, that the focus of moral duty has shifted from "other" to "self'' 
in ways that make it harder for us to count on others to make our 
interests theirs. 
I have repeatedly said "hypothesize" instead of "assert." I know of 
no direct proof of my hypothesis. If you ask people flatly whether they 
"trust" their family members, almost all of them will say yes. But I 
doubt that they have in mind the kind of "distrust" I am discussing-
an inability to predict the behavior, particularly the long-term behavior, 
2. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 26 
(Free Press, 1995). 
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of people in intimate life and their willingness to put familial interests 
ahead of their own. Indirect evidence of familial distrust, however, 
abounds. 
First, social trust has plainly diminished in the United States. For 
example, the number of us who feel "most people" can be trusted has 
fallen in thirty years from 58 to 37 percent. Second, because familial 
life has become so unstable it would be strange if we had the same 
confidence in its predictability. Much of this essay will be devoted to 
specifying elements of culture that should make people less trusting in 
their family life. 
Third, considerable irregular but suggestive evidence hints that peo-
ple regard intimate life less trustfully. For instance, Glenn's survey of 
college texts on family life reveals that warnings to be wary now 
abound in these semi-official versions of the conventional wisdom. 
Thus one book's main goal seemed to be "to persuade students not to 
be too committed, not to love too much, and to be careful not to give 
more than they get in marriage and other family relationships .... " 3 
High school textbooks too portray intimacy bleakly: "[T]he world view 
that these textbooks convey to teenagers is a depressing one: You are 
alone. You must take responsibility for yourself because, in the final 
analysis, the only person you can rely on is you. Many families are 
dysfunctional, even abusive. Everyone's motives are ultimately self-
regarding. " 4 This distrust is also exemplified by complaints that have 
become a cliche about the unwillingness of people (especially men) to 
"commit." As one memoirist writes, "We lived in an age in which 
commitment had been bled out of the culture and which was, instead, 
saturated with temptation .... Our times encouraged faithlessness.'' 5 
But why commit yourself? Confidence in married life seems to have 
dimmed quite perceptibly. Consider, for example, the collection of es-
says on marriage entitled Here Lies My Heart. 6 Almost none of them 
e~presses anything like enthusiasm for marriage. "For Better and 
Worse" pretty well captures the warmest view of it. The collection is 
rife with lamentations on the dolors of marriage. Marriage "is a long 
patience," "a job of work," a "savage business," "an institution that 
hasn't served women well" and that can even be "a barbarous insti-
tution." Knowing what they know, marriage counselors should not be 
3. Norval D. Glenn, A Critique of Twenty Family and Marriage and the Family 
Textbooks, 46 Family Relations 197, 199 (1997). 
4. Council on Families, The Course of True Love: Marriage in High School Text-
books 17 (Institute for American Values, 1998). 
5. John Taylor, Falling: The Story of One Marriage 139-40 (Random House, 1999). 
6. Deborah Chasman & Catherine Jhee, eds, Here Lies My Heart: Essay on Why 
We Marry, Why We Don't, and What We Find There (Beacon Press, 1999). 
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able to sleep at night, but "should stand on their rooftops in their pa-
jamas with megaphones, shouting, 'Citizens! Heed my words! Never 
marry! Marriage is bad! Marriage is a bloodbath!' " 
III. The Causes of Distrust: 
The Erosion of Rules 
One must begin any discussion of the swelling of distrust in family 
life by citing the extraordinary ascent of the divorce rate, which, al-
though it has moderated somewhat, remains imposingly high. The rate 
is well known. And it has now been high long enough that many of us 
are divorced or grew up in families with divorced parents. This knowl-
edge and experience must make spouses warier of each other and chil-
dren warier of their parents. But our distrust also arises from broad and 
deep movements in American culture, movements that seem likely to 
persist and prosper. I suggested a moment ago that we regard others as 
less reliable than before partly because their behavior is less predict-
able. It is less predictable because it is less guided by rules, rules of 
custom, etiquette, and morality. Rules make behavior predictable, and 
as rules weaken, people become less predictable. 
Intimate life today teems with rules whose clarity and force have 
declined. The customs governing courtship are less certain and forceful 
than before. The rules governing marriage are less settled than before. 
Not only have the old sex roles (man as provider, woman as housewife) 
been gutted, they have not been replaced with broadly accepted under-
standings of how to behave in a marriage. The norms governing parents 
and children have also weakened. Parents today must ask a broader 
range of questions about their relationship with their children than ever 
before, particularly where the parents are unmarried, divorced, or re-
married. I do not wish to overstate the case. Certainly some broad 
understandings about marriage and parenthood are still healthy. Nev-
ertheless, as Alan Wolfe concludes, "the postmodern family form is 
ruled by an absence of rules: both spouses go in and out of the labor 
market; children are not necessarily the biological offspring of the 
adults with whom they live; sexual preference is polymorphous; and 
extended kin are not necessarily related by blood." 7 
Weakened norms have their advantages. Some of the weakened 
norms were bad norms. And weak norms allow people more freedom 
7. Alan Wolfe, One Nation, After All: What Middle-Class Americans Really Think 
About God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, The 
Right, The Left, and Each Other 100-Ql (Viking, 1998). 
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to arrange their lives as they choose. But my point here is that the 
weakening of norms makes people's behavior less predictable and thus 
makes trust more perilous. 
To gain a fuller sense of how far the rules governing family life have 
eroded and how likely they are to erode further, we need to ask why 
they have eroded. Of course, as I just said, some rules are failing be-
cause they seem to have failed, because they now seem unwise or even 
vicious. But the erosion of rules is also promoted by a bewildering 
array of cultural forces and actors. Some of these forces and actors, left 
to their own devices, might well substitute new rules and roles for old, 
leaving us with a restored clarity of expectations. Feminism in many 
of its incarnations perhaps falls into this category. However, others of 
them seem inimical to the very idea of rules and roles. American ideas 
about individualism, freedom, and autonomy exemplify this category. 
Those ideas have been given new life in this century by the rise of what 
we may call the therapeutic imperative. This imperative asks us to think 
about ourselves and our relationships in the language and terms of 
psychology (or rather, of various popularized versions of psychology). 
The therapeutic imperative has contributed as largely as any social force 
to transforming the culture and morality of American private life. It 
therefore deserves our special attention, and I will use it as a vehicle 
for organizing my description of general changes in our moral and 
social culture. 
At the core of much of the therapeutic imperative lies the principle 
that the first human obligation is to identify, develop, and express one's 
true self. This obligation can be fulfilled only by freeing oneself from 
the impositions of social rules and roles. Such versions of the thera-
peutic imperative, then, erode rules not just by criticizing some or pro-
posing others, but by directly attacking the very idea of them. 
The effectiveness of this attack on rules has been sharpened by the 
weakening of social institutions that used to promote them but that are 
ever more loath to do so. These institutions have increasingly adopted 
a therapeutic approach-foreswearing the directive, the "moralistic," 
and the "judgmental." The tendency in contemporary schools, for ex-
ample, is to "clarify" values, not to teach them. Even churches have 
moved impressively toward a therapeutic and remissive ethos. Less 
formal institutions are similar. Perhaps the most notable example is 
support groups, which have achieved rapid and remarkable social prom-
inence. These groups are designed to permit people to discuss their 
intimate lives with those who share their problems. But their rules of 
engagement normally prohibit any tinge of the normative. Finally, the 
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norm against norms has migrated from the precincts of institutions to 
the privacies of daily life-being "supportive" is the goal; being 
"judgmental" the vice. 
The reluctance to prescribe and to judge seems particularly acute 
when the basis for prescription and judgment is moral. Alan Wolfe's 
fascinating investigation of middle-class Americans describes an em-
phatic skepticism of moral thought. 8 And since so many Americans see 
morality as a virtually adventitious personal choice, their skepticism 
swells to the bursting point when moral ideas are used to comment on 
the behavior of other people. But Americans are coming to seem as 
reluctant to impose standards on themselves as on others. Wolfe, for 
example, found that "middle-class Americans no longer believe that 
right and wrong provide unerring guidelines for informing them about 
how to lead their lives. " 9 My law and medical students now resemble 
the young people Tipton describes who believe that a "sense of prin-
cipled obligation ... applies forcefully to political issues" but who feel 
that, "applied to the realm of personal behavior and relationships, ... 
such an ethic of obligation is ... , first, ... uncomfortably constraining 
and unrealistic in relation to the actual operation of self-interest" and, 
second, likely "to suffocate expressive ideals of personal behavior." 10 
As one memoirist says, "Marriage demands virtue, but virtue is an 
amputation, and what is lost is one of the things that make one feel 
most alive." 11 
I have been arguing that people's behavior is made less predictable 
and thus less reliable by the widespread erosion of rules in American 
culture and that much of this erosion is due to the therapeutic impera-
tive. But at least one rule has not eroded in the new dispensation; in-
deed, it has triumphed. Its effect, however, is to make behavior less 
reliable. This new rule represents one of the central shifts in contem-
porary moral culture. It is that we should all judge for ourselves how 
to behave and that we should maximize our own welfare, leaving others 
to look after themselves (as it is their duty to do). Thus Rice quotes 
Melody Beattie, an avatar of the therapeutic gospel, who considered it 
"a sign of her own recovery that 'I'm starting to think about and con-
sider what I want and need' first before considering others' wants and 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 300. 
10. Steven M. Tipton, Getting Saved from the Sixties 107 (U. California Press, 
1982). 
11. Lynn Darling, For Better and Worse, in Deborah Chasman & Catherine Jhee, 
eds., Here Lies My Heart. Essay on Why We Marry, Why We Don't, and What We Find 
There 197 (Beacon Press, 1999). 
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needs. By placing her own wishes ahead of others, she has begun to 
master the necessary arts of what she calls 'self-care .... ' " 12 
Making the duty to oneself life's central moral obligation works a 
volcanic change in our moral landscape. One of its central effects is to 
increase distrust in intimate life by making our intimates less predict-
able. It does so because it obliges people to leave relationships they 
think are serving them inadequately. Furthermore, it motivates people 
to act on unexpected grounds. For example, many interpretations of the 
therapeutic ethos require people not only to follow their own true na-
tures, but to "grow." Since, however, the direction of "growth" is not, 
and presumably cannot be, specified, who can say where it might lead? 
Indeed, a conventional route to growth is to leave oneself open to ex-
perience and spontaneity. To limit oneself in advance to any single 
relationship or activity or life is to curtail the possibilities of growth 
intolerably. 
This aversion to stability and predictability demands that "commit-
ment" be redefined. Thus one memoirist writes, 
When I commit to a person, I commit to the experience we will have 
together; I commit to the process of growth that comes from building the 
trust underlying our intimacy, to working through differences and issues. 
I accept that the person I may have needed and adored five years or even 
five months ago, the person with whom I created an environment of 
stability and constancy, may not be the person I need and adore now, 
when I want a companion with whom I can experience myself in a way 
that feels vast and fluid. 13 
And thus some couples promise to stay married "as long as our love 
shall last." 14 
But the significance for us here of the new primacy of the duty to 
oneself lies not just in the ways it makes intimate behavior unpredict-
able. It also undercuts a sense of duty to other people and thus corrodes 
our conviction that we can depend on others to act in our interest even 
when it conflicts with theirs. Many feminists are skeptical and even 
scornful of altruism in marriage because they believe it is likelier to be 
expected of women than men, and they seem more inclined to cure that 
12. John Steadman Rice, A Disease of One's Own: Psychotherapy, Addiction, and 
the Emergence of Co-Dependency 162 (Transaction Publishers, 1998) (emphasis in 
Beattie). 
13. Rebecca Walker, Serial Lover; in Deborah Chasman & Catherine Jhee, eds., 
Here Lies My Heart: Essay on Why We Marry, Why We Don't, and What We Find 
There 48-49 (Beacon Press, 1999). 
14. Marjorie Ingall, Going to the Temple, in Deborah Chasman & Catherine Jhee, 
eds., Here Lies My Heart: Essay on Why We Marry, Why We Don't, and What We Find 
There 29 (Beacon Press, 1999). 
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disparity by deprecating sacrifice than by demanding it impartially. But 
that skepticism and scorn are widely shared. As one memoirist com-
ments, "We have no modem affinity for the Edwardian sense of sac-
rifice as an endorphin high." 15 
Not only is sacrifice for other people scouted, but it is more accept-
able to say that we need not concern ourselves when we make other 
people unhappy. In his illuminating study of relationships in Holland 
that rings uncannily true of America, Brinkgreve quotes a young 
woman who says, " 'If I have to choose between something which is 
good for the relationship or for myself I choose for myself .... If I meet 
somebody I feel like going to bed with and this gives my boy-friend 
sleepless nights that's his problem .... ' " 16 
The new primacy of the duty to oneself creates distrust in another 
way-by making us fearful of threats to our autonomy and develop-
ment. Much in the therapeutic ethos warns us that our ability to shape 
our lives is constantly imperilled by the demands other people make 
on us. We are, most vulnerable to this threat among our intimates, and 
thus it is against their impositions that we must be alert. This source 
of distrust is institutionalized in, for example, an association for "co-
dependents" which encourages its members to review the wrongs done 
to them and to assess blame for it. 17 They typically "conclude that 
extrication and autonomy from all externally imposed requirements 
(save those involved in being co-dependent) are their principal tasks." 18 
These members "convene in the safety and sanctity of their weekly 
meetings in much the same way the people once returned home after a 
hard day in the often-cold world of work. ... [K]in and close relation-
ships have become part of that larger, colder world." 19 
IV. Distrust and Vulnerability 
I have been arguing that distrust in American family life has been 
heightened in recent years because behavior has become less predict-
able and because people feel less constrained to accommodate their 
behavior to other people's wants and wills. I now wish to argue that 
15. Lynn Darling, For Better and Worse (cited in note 11). 
16. Christien Brinkgreve, On Modem Relationships: The Commandments of the 
New Freedom, 18 The Netherlands' J. of Sociology 47, 51 (1982). 
17. John Steadman Rice, A Disease of One's Own: Psychotherapy, Addiction, and 
the Emergence of Co-Dependency 61 (Transaction Publishers, 1998). 
18. Id. at 165. 
19. ld. at 173. I discuss many of these developments at greater length in The Prac-
tice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions 153-76 (Oxford U Press, 
1998). 
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that sense of distrust has been intensified by a congeries of attitudes 
that make people feel more vulnerable. These attitudes are surprisingly 
numerous and influential, and they thus command our attention. 
To begin with, we are more vulnerable to disappointment in family 
life because our aspirations for life generally are higher than before. 
Let me count the ways. First, we value "control" more. We now expect 
control over many aspects of our lives, and we believe its absence has 
malign effects. Second, we value independence more, and we see it as 
constantly endangered. Third, the therapeutic imperative promises 
health and happiness. Medical science has made conspicuous progress 
toward the first of these, and hope for the second is probably livelier 
than ever. Finally, we expect more gratifications than earlier generations 
from our intimate relationships. We expect unexampled kinds of equal-
ity. We expect unexampled degrees of sexual fulfillment. We expect 
unexampled breadth of psychological compatibility. We expect unex-
ampled depths of communication. 
The second way we feel more vulnerable in family life is that we 
are more aware of misbehavior. This feeling too has many sources. Not 
least is the therapeutic ethos. At a general level, some of its versions 
suggest that people are racked and rent by motives so dismaying they 
cannot even be acknowledged. The therapeutic ethos has also sharpened 
our sense that people act abominably in private life. We are, for ex-
ample, much more aware of domestic violence, and we regularly hear 
alarming and even exaggerated estimates of the extent of the physical 
and sexual abuse of children, of spousal abuse, of brutalization of el-
derly parents, of date rape, and of rape. 
The third reason we feel more vulnerable in our intimate lives is that 
we increasingly doubt that people can control their behavior. We sus-
pect that people are motivated by social and psychological forces that 
are powerful and dangerous and that they themselves do not fully un-
derstand or even notice. The tendency to describe bad habits, vices, 
and even virtues as addictions exemplifies this source of vulnerability. 
So does his wife's explanation that the President of the United States 
can hardly prevent himself from molesting young women because of 
the way his mother and grandmother treated him. 
Yet another cause of our increased vulnerability is this: not only are 
we likelier to believe that misdeeds within families are more common 
and less controllable, we are also more inclined to believe that the evil 
done there cuts deeper and lasts longer than we had thought. We are, 
for example, more apt to believe that child abuse of many kinds injures 
children indescribably and irreparably. 
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Our sense of vulnerability is honed by yet another cultural devel-
opment. We Americans increasingly believe that we cannot fully un-
derstand people whose exact experiences we have not shared. We sus-
pect that individuals differ so greatly that they must be opaque to each 
other, that people who have not shared an experience cannot compre-
hend it (this is one reason support groups have flourished), that mem-
bers of different cultural groups cannot truly understand each other (it 
is dogma in some circles, for example, that white parents should not 
be permitted to adopt black children because they cannot understand 
black culture well enough to raise those children properly), and that 
men and women can barely comprehend each other (as Martians pre-
sumably cannot understand Venusians). 
We feel more vulnerable for still another reason. We are increasingly 
thrown back on our own resources in dealing with people and problems. 
One of the many reasons is that the cultural shifts I have been describing 
deprive people of the guidance of the familiar and assign them exclu-
sive responsibility for discovering and developing themselves. The 
price of autonomy is responsibility-nondelegable responsibility. Thus 
Wuthnow discovered in his study of support groups that "[t]he social 
norm tells [people] that they should not get involved in their friends' 
and neighbors' business. It says that people should figure out their own 
lives, make their own choices, and suffer their own mistakes." 20 Per-
haps it is this sense of being cast back on our own resources that makes 
us so hungry for expert assistance. 
In sum, Americans today seem less trusting than before. They ve-
hemently distrust their government's competence and even motives. 
Less vociferously, they seem to trust their intimates less. They can have 
less confidence in the predictability of their behavior. They have less 
reason to think that they will behave solicitously and will remain loyal. 
So how has family law accommodated this cultural development? 
V. Law and Distrust 
Cultural developments do not change law the way rudders steer 
boats. They have no direct, mechanical effect. No legislator sits down 
and says, "Distrust is rising, so how should we revise family law?" 
Nevertheless, law eventually accommodates cultural changes of suffi-
cient moment. This family law has begun to do. In what follows, I want 
to chart some of those accommodations. 
20. Robert Wuthnow, Sharing the Journey: Support Groups and America's New 
Quest for Community 176-177 (Free Press, 1994). 
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The law of entry into marriage changes little and slowly. But today 
one major development is the effort to find ways to address a salient 
cause and effect of distrust in marriage-one spouse's fear that the 
other will leave. This development seeks to encourage people to agree 
before they marry to make their marriage hard to leave. The most 
prominent example has been the "covenant marriage" that has been 
proposed in a number of states but so far adopted only in Louisiana 
and Arizona. 
This leads us to the question of divorce and to a lesson in the com-
plexity of the law's accommodation of distrust. The overwhelming 
trend in divorce law has been to make marriage easier to leave. First 
the grounds for "fault" divorce were expanded, particularly by an ever-
broadening interpretation of "cruelty." Then no-fault divorce made di-
vorce essentially available on demand to anyone willing to take the 
time and endure the (sometimes considerable) trouble. Some jurisdic-
tions have also tried to make smooth the path to uncontested divorces 
through various procedural reforms. 
But what does this have to do with distrust, and how can making 
divorce easier be a response to distrust when making divorce harder is 
also a response to it? The answer is that we approach marriage with 
two kinds of fears-fears that we may be abandoned by our spouse 
and fears that we may find our spouse unbearable. Covenant marriage 
is a way of relieving the first anxiety, easier divorce a way of relieving 
the second. 
The move to no-fault divorce illustrates the law's accommodation of 
another kind of distrust-distrust of governmental agents. Tradition-
ally, judges could decide case by case whether a divorce was justified. 
When no-fault divorce began to proliferate, the new laws might have 
been read as obliging judges to make similar decisions about whether 
a marriage had in fact succumbed to "irreconcilable differences." How-
ever, skepticism about the ability of judges to make either kind of 
decision has helped lead us to the present flat rule of divorce on de-
mand. 
Distrust of quite an active kind has led to substantial changes in the 
law regulating domestic violence. Here the law's response to the cul-
tural sense that people-especially men-are likely to behave savagely 
in families has been quite direct. The definition of both spouse abuse 
and child abuse has been expanded. Any kind of assault on a spouse is 
likelier to be treated as a crime, and new forms of child abuse (including 
even prenatal abuse) have been recognized. Parental kidnapping has 
won a remarkably vigorous statutory response. The law is also likelier 
to prohibit as domestic abuse assaults against intimates to whom one 
is not married or related by blood. 
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Not only has the scope of abuse law expanded; it has also been 
enforced more aggressively. Some jurisdictions have instituted policies 
of automatic arrest in cases of spousal violence. What once would have 
been regarded as minor batteries are more likely to be prosecuted. Some 
jurisdictions make it a policy to prosecute even against the wishes of 
the assaulted spouse. Finally, the vogue some years ago for making the 
reunification of children and their abusive parents a first consideration 
has begun to recede in the face of a growing conviction that children 
"at risk" need more determined protection. 
In one sense, the law regulating the distribution of marital wealth on 
divorce is an exception to the pattern I have been describing. The rise 
of equitable distribution confides considerable power to the discretion 
of judges. However, we may now be witnessing the beginning of at-
tempts-like the ALI's-to devise new rules that will reduce that dis-
cretion. What is more, the movement away from the fixed rules of the 
common law and community property regimes has been driven by dis-
trust of the rules government had been applying and by the sense that 
the old rules provided too little protection against the untrustworthy 
behavior of spouses (especially of husbands). Those rules were seen as 
too likely to trap wives economically in marriages that had become 
intolerable and too likely to permit husbands to reap the benefit of their 
wives' uncompensated labor. 
In response, the law has moved toward reducing the vulnerability of 
people who cannot depend on remaining married. This has been done 
by devising theories that give wives broader and surer claims to a part 
of the marital wealth, particularly theories that take into account the 
economic value of the wife's contributions (like housework) to the 
family's well-being. It has also been done by expanding the category 
of "property" and by inventing devices like "reimbursement alimony" 
so that professional degrees, the goodwill of businesses, and pensions 
can be divided on divorce. 
In recent years, the law has become markedly more tolerant of at-
tempts to organize spouses' relationships through legally binding con-
tracts. Contracts regulating the distribution of property on the death of 
a spouse had long been enforceable, but now courts are more willing 
to recognize contracts regulating the distribution of property on divorce 
as well. Commentators would have the law go much further, and the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act would allow the spouses to regulate 
any aspect of their relationship as long as the agreement did not violate 
"public policy." 
This development fits my hypothesis with special precision. People 
enter into legally binding contracts when they do not believe that those 
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with whom they plan to deal will reliably act in their interests. It has 
conventionally been thought that, as Ellickson says, "When parties are 
intimately close-knit, ... contracting may not be in their interest. The 
arm's length negotiation of a contract can pollute the atmosphere of a 
close relationship by implying that the parties don't trust each other 
enough to rely on informal exchange. " 21 These doubts about the role 
of contracts in intimate life, however, are increasingly overwhelmed by 
the sense of the unpredictability of one's marriage, the unreliability of 
one's spouse, and the capriciousness of the law's judges. 
As marriage is increasingly seen as perilous, alternatives to it look 
more attractive. This has helped lead to the substantial rise in the num-
ber of cohabiting couples. Many states have acknowledged this by ac-
cording cohabitation legal status. On the other hand, cohabitation itself 
is risky. It is in some ways riskier than marriage, since people usually 
enter it less deliberately than marriage, with less commitment to each 
other, and with less sense of what they expect of each other. To reduce 
those risks, some jurisdictions-most famously California-have prof-
fered the law's services in resolving the separating couple's disputes 
over their economic relations. 
In the law of child custody, recent decades have seen repeated at-
tempts to reduce the range of discretion judges may exercise. In par-
ticular, jurisdictions have experimented with various rules and pre-
sumptions, prominently including preferences for joint custody and for 
the primary caretaker. These experiments are driven by several motives, 
but not the least of them is an acid distrust of the ability of judges to 
make wise decisions and a bitter apprehension that, left to their own 
devices, judges will be animated by improper and deplorable motives. 
Reforms in the law of child support have been driven by similar 
concerns. Judges' child support orders have long been thought too ca-
pricious, and the response has been the adoption (at the behest of the 
federal government) of guidelines intended to cabin judicial discretion. 
However, the primary motive for these guidelines was less distrust of 
judicial discretion and more distrust of parental decency. Particularly, 
there has been considerable agreement that too many parents-par-
ticularly fathers-have betrayed the most elemental of their financial 
duties to their children. The child-support guidelines, then, attempt to 
ensure that judges will make those duties legally binding obligations. 
In addition, and again spurred by the federal government, elaborate 
efforts have been made to enforce those obligations once they have 
21. Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 247 
(Harvard U Press, 1991). 
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been established. These efforts have included provisions for enforcing 
them against noncustodial parents in foreign states, for having them 
enforced by the government, for collecting payments from the noncus-
todial parent's debtors, and so on. In addition, the scope of the duty of 
support has been increased in some jurisdictions by expanding some-
what the parents' obligation to support their adult children and by 
tentative steps toward making people who are not legally parents but 
who are acting as parents enforceably responsible for their children's 
support. 
Finally, a number of areas of family law have been constitutionalized, 
most notably the law of abortion. This is the prototypical area in which 
distrust of governmental regulation is expressed. However, in these 
areas too distrust of the government is mixed with distrust of individ-
uals. For example, the once undoubted and statutorily confirmed power 
of parents to counsel and make decisions for their minor children has 
been overthrown where a young girl seeks to have an abortion. This 
has been done precisely because of distrust of parents' kindness and 
justness in dealing with their children. 
I have argued that Americans distrust their government and their 
social institutions more, that they trust each other less than they used 
to, and that they find even their intimates less reliable. I have argued 
that the law has accommodated these developments. The result of that 
accommodation, however, is curiously irregular. It forms no neat pat-
terns. But this should not be surprising. When you distrust everyone, 
there is no one to whom you can confide authority. Rather, you seek 
(often unsystematically, area by area, case by case) to scatter authority 
broadly enough that no one can do very great harm. And this is, after 
all, the old American tradition, the tradition of dispersed power, of 
checks and balances. That is family law at the end of the century-at, 
if you insist, the end of the millennium. But what family law will be 
at the end of the next century-no, at the end of the next decade-
who can be trusted to say? 
